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The concept of conditional conservatism has provided new insight into financial reporting and 
has stimulated considerable research since Basu (1997) developed it. While the concept 
encapsulated in the adage “anticipate no profits but anticipate all losses” is reasonably clear, 
estimating it is the subject of some discussion, notably by Dietrich et al. (2007), Givoly et al. 
(2007), and Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2011). Recently, Patatoukas and Thomas (2011) report 
important evidence of possible bias in firm-level cross-sectional estimates of conditional 
conservatism (asymmetric earnings timeliness) which they attribute to scale effects. They advise 
researchers to avoid using conditional conservatism estimates or making inferences from prior 
research using them, a view we regard as excessively alarmist. Our theoretical and empirical 
analyses suggest the explanation is a correlated omitted variables problem that can be addressed 
in a straightforward fashion, for example by fixed-effects regression. We show that cross-
sectional correlation between the expected components of earnings and returns confounds the 
relation between the news components, and biases estimates of how earnings incorporates the 
news in returns (e.g., timeliness). We also show that the correlation between the expected 
components of earnings and returns depends on the sign of returns, biasing estimates of 
asymmetric timeliness. When firm-specific effects in earnings are taken into account, estimates 
of asymmetric timeliness do not exhibit the bias, are statistically and economically significant 
(though smaller in magnitude and perhaps more consistent with priors), and behave as a 
predictable function of market-to-book, size and leverage. It would be surprising if this was not 
the case. Conditional conservatism accords with the long-standing accounting principle of 
anticipating losses but not gains, with specific asymmetric accounting rules such as the lower-of-
cost-or-market method for inventories and the rules for impairment of long term assets, and with 
loss recognition practices that occurred prior to the promulgation of formal rules.
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On Estimating Conditional Conservatism 
1.  Introduction 
Since its introduction by Basu (1997), the concept of conditional conservatism has 
provided both new insight into financial reporting practice and an impetus to accounting 
research.  The novel insight in the concept of conditional conservatism lies in defining 
conservatism as an asymmetric response to new information. Previously, conservatism had been 
viewed as an unconditional asymmetric response to uncertainty: when faced with a range of 
possible book values of stockholders’ equity, select a low value.  Basu’s (1997) seminal 
contribution was the concept of financial reporting being more attuned to recognizing bad news 
about firm value than good news. This concept of conservatism requires financial reporting 
behavior to be correlated with real economic income, and in particular for the financial 
statements to better reflect contemporaneous real economic losses.1 Because it is founded on new 
information, this concept of conservatism is capable of playing important economic roles, many 
of which have been explored in the literature. 2 
Basu (1997) also provides estimators of the conditional conservatism concept. We 
address the primary estimator, the incremental coefficient on negative returns in a piecewise 
linear regression of accounting income (scaled by beginning stock price) on contemporaneous 
stock return.3 Because income recognition in accounting is largely a choice between timely and 
deferred incorporation of economic gains and losses, conditional conservatism also is known as 
asymmetrically timely loss recognition and the incremental coefficient on negative returns is 
known as the asymmetric timeliness coefficient. The focus on accounting income is due to it 
being a sensitive barometer of financial reporting in general, in that income statement variables 
                                                 
1 Accounting practices such as routinely expensing early, deferring revenue and under-reporting book value lead to 
unconditional but not conditional conservatism, because they are not correlated with contemporaneous real income. 
2 Watts (2003) and Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev (2011) survey an extensive list of studies. 
3 The secondary estimator is a piecewise linear regression of change in accounting income on lagged change. 
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are structurally correlated with changes in balance sheet variables. Income statement timeliness 
thus is an indicator of financial reporting timeliness generally. The rationale for specifying 
accounting income as the dependent variable, in contrast to the earlier “earnings response 
coefficient” literature in which it is the independent variable, is that accounting income is the 
variable whose properties are being estimated. The independent variable, contemporaneous stock 
return, is a proxy for new information about firm value during the fiscal period, including 
accounting income.  
Using a pooled cross-sectional and time-series regression, Basu (1997) reports that the 
sensitivity of accounting income to decreases in firm value (“bad news”) exceeds its sensitivity 
to increases in value (“good news”). This finding accords with the long-standing accounting 
principle of anticipating losses but not gains, with a host of asymmetric accounting rules such as 
the lower-of-cost-or-market method for inventories and the various asset impairment rules for 
long term tangible and intangible assets, and with loss recognition practices such as impairments 
and restructuring charges that occurred prior to the promulgation of formal rules. 
While the concept of accounting income being more attuned to economic losses than 
economic profits is reasonably clear, estimating the actual effect of that asymmetry on 
accounting income is the subject of some discussion. Dietrich et al. (2007) and Givoly et al. 
(2007) offer criticisms of the Basu estimator. Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2011) conclude that 
these criticisms do not invalidate the Basu (1997) regression as an estimator of asymmetric 
incorporation of news in earnings. By formulating the earnings-returns relation entirely in terms 
of news, they implicitly assume that the expected components of earnings and returns are 
accounted for by the model’s intercept.  Patatoukas and Thomas (2011), who we refer to as PT 
from this point onwards, provide important empirical evidence suggesting bias in the Basu 
estimator.  They replace current-period price-deflated earnings per share as the dependent 
3 
variable in the Basu regression with its lagged counterpart and also with the inverse of lagged 
price, and observe a significantly negative incremental coefficient on negative returns (the proxy 
for “bad news”). They attribute this anomalous result to scale-related effects, arguing that price 
(which is used to scale earnings) is inversely related to stock return variance (causing a “variance 
effect”) and positively related to scaled earnings and hence negatively related to the incidence of 
losses (a “loss effect”). 
We build on and provide a different interpretation of the anomalous evidence reported by 
PT. We begin by replicating their results. We then demonstrate that scale-related effects are not 
the explanation. To isolate the effects of scale, we eliminate approximately 99% of its variation 
by sorting observations into relatively narrow portfolios based on price, such that within each 
portfolio the cross-sectional variation in scale essentially is eliminated.  If scale effects explain 
the anomalous evidence, it would disappear within these portfolios, but it persists: the estimated 
asymmetric timeliness remains considerable. We conclude that the data do not support the scale-
related explanation. 4 It thus becomes necessary to look for a better explanation.   
We show, both analytically and empirically, that the Basu regression’s incremental 
coefficient on negative returns is a biased estimator of the relation between the news components 
of returns and earnings when there is no control for cross-sectional variation in the expected 
components of returns and earnings. This is similar in nature to a correlated omitted variable 
problem, and confounds the Basu estimator unless controlled for.  Bias due to correlated-omitted 
variables is a well-known econometric issue (Greene, 2003, chapter 8) that accounting 
researchers have encountered previously, for example in the context of discretionary accruals 
literature (e.g., McNichols, 2000; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005). 
                                                 
4 Furthermore, we obtain the same result when we isolate variance effects by sorting observations into 50 narrow 
portfolios based on the standard deviation of past returns, thus controlling for variance effects within each portfolio. 
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We offer several simple ways to improve on the standard Basu (1997) specification to 
address the bias.  Both an uncomplicated control for a small number of well-known risk factors 
and a relatively crude way of removing the expected components of firms’ earnings substantially 
reduce bias and increase confidence in estimates of asymmetric timeliness.  Furthermore, a 
simple inclusion of firm fixed effects essentially eliminates the bias, which becomes 
insignificant.  We also demonstrate that controlling for expected earnings eliminates the 
systematic variation of bias with several firm characteristics often used as proxies for conditional 
conservatism (Khan and Watts, 2010) as well as for risk (Fama and French, 1992, 1993).   
PT advise researchers they “should heed the call in Dietrich et al. (2007) and Givoly et al. 
(2007) to avoid the [asymmetric timeliness coefficient] measure” (page 2), but they offer no 
solution to the problem. This advice is difficult to reconcile with accounting principles, rules and 
practices, which suggest that conditional conservatism is more than a statistical artifact. It also is 
difficult to reconcile with the large number of studies reporting Basu estimates of conditional 
conservatism that are consistent with credible hypotheses. The importance of this literature, 
together with advice that its results be discarded, makes this issue worthy of further study. Our 
objective in this paper therefore is to investigate further the cause and econometric nature of this 
intriguing bias, and to determine whether and how the bias can be reduced or eliminated 
empirically.  
We conclude that PT’s advice to completely avoid using the Basu estimator, and to avoid 
making inferences from research based on it, is unnecessarily alarmist. More work is needed to 
understand the economic nature of the relation between expected returns and the expected level 
of earnings, but in the meantime we recommend that researchers interested in measuring 
5 
conditional conservatism simply control for firm-specific effects, at least as a robustness check, 
to avoid potentially spurious inferences.5   
Section 2 describes the econometric effects of failing to isolate the expected components 
of earnings and returns in estimating the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient.  Data and 
descriptive statistics are summarized in section 3.  Section 4 presents the result that scale effects 
do not bias the Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficient. Section 5 demonstrates that a non-linear 
correlation between the expected values of earnings and returns is present in the data, and that 
the problem can be addressed with simple and well-known methods including a fixed firm 
effects specification.  Section 6 provides further analysis of time series and cross sectional 
variation in conditional conservatism estimates. In section 7 we discuss our results and their 
implications for empirical analyses of conditional conservatism, and provide concluding 
remarks.   
2.  Effect of failing to isolate the expected component in earnings 
The widely-used Basu estimator is the regression function: 
 1 0 1 0 1/ ( 0) ( 0)*it it it it it it itX P a a D R b R b D R R          (1) 
where Xit is earnings per share for firm i in year t, 1itP  is beginning of period price, Rit is stock 
return, D(.) is an indicator function taking the value of one when stock returns are negative and 
zero otherwise, and 1b is the asymmetric timeliness coefficient.   
In this section, we show analytically that estimates of the relation between the news 
components of earnings and returns are biased by correlation between their expected 
components.  We first show that the PT explanation also can be cast more formally as a 
correlated omitted variable problem. 
                                                 
5 This conclusion is similar to that of Beaver and Ryan (2009, p.8) when analyzing non-linearity caused by risky 
debt, rather than conditionally conservative financial reporting. 
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2.1. Understanding the loss and variance effects hypothesis. PT propose that estimates of 
conditional conservatism are affected by two empirical regularities related to scaling the 
variables in the Basu estimator by price. They report evidence that price is: (1) inversely related 
to return variance, which they refer to as the “variance effect”; and (2) positively related to the 
level and sign of lagged price-deflated earnings, which they refer to as the “loss effect.”  They 
argue that these two scale-related effects, in combination, yield a pattern in the return-earnings 
relation that can be mistakenly attributed to conditional conservatism.   
Interpretation of these results is difficult because the connection PT draw between scale-
related effects and estimated Basu coefficients is strictly intuitive, without formal analysis. This 
makes it somewhat difficult to understand the exact nature of the econometric problem they 
propose. Moreover, their claim that the results are explained by the “sample truncation bias” 
thesis in Dietrich et al. (2007) is difficult to see, for two reasons.  First, truncation and scaling are 
different econometric issues.  Second, their interpretation is puzzling because it is inconsistent 
with the formal analysis of Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2011), who show that the Basu estimator 
does not suffer from truncation bias and provides a valid measure of conditional conservatism in 
the response of earnings to the news in stock returns. The latter observation provides an 
important clue in searching for the source of the bias: by definition, news is the difference 
between the actual outcome and its expected value, so perhaps the bias arises from the structure 
of the correlation between the expected values of earnings and returns. 
It therefore is constructive to represent the arguments more formally. To do so, we use 
the following relations: 
 1 1 10 11 1 1 1/it it it itX P p        ,                                                                                  (2a) 
1 20 21 22 23 2 1( 0) ( 0)*it it it it it itp D R R D R R                                                   (2b) 
7 
where 1 1log( ).it itp P  6 The loss effect implies 11 0.   The variance effect implies 22 0   and
23 0.   Because stock price is negatively correlated with its variance, the absolute magnitude of 
positive (negative) returns is negatively (positively) related to price.  
Substituting equation (2b) into (2a) gives: 
1 1 10 11 21 11 21 11 22 11 23 1/ ( 0) ( 0)*it it it it it it itX P D R R D R R u                        (3) 
The loss and variance effects together predict a negative coefficient ( 11 22 0   ) on itR  and a 
positive coefficient ( 11 23 0   ) on the interaction term ( 0) *it itD R R , which is a central PT 
finding. This finding is anomalous, since it involves both earnings predicting future returns and 
the relation between earnings and future returns exhibiting an asymmetry that mimics (in sign 
but not in magnitude) that reported by Basu (1997) and myriad ensuing studies. 
 The scale-effects argument implies that scale is a correlated omitted variable and that it 
should be controlled for in Basu regressions (and perhaps more broadly). In Section 4 we show 
empirically that the scale explanation unsatisfactory. An alternative explanation therefore is 
required, to which we now turn. 
2.2. Understanding the source of the bias. To understand the nature of the bias, we 
initially examine it analytically. We show that an implicit assumption in using the Basu (1997) 
model to estimate the incorporation of news into earnings is that the expected components of 
earnings and returns do not vary in cross-section and thus are absorbed by the intercepts. The 
apparent bias in Basu estimates then arises from failure to control for cross-sectional differences 
in expected returns and earnings. To understand the implications of this implicit assumption we 
                                                 
6 While PT use 1/ ௜ܲ௧ିଵ to demonstrate the variance effect, we specify scale as log ሺ ௜ܲ௧ିଵሻ in equation (2b) to make 
the argument considerably more straightforward. The two variables are highly (negatively) correlated. Indeed, they 
are perfectly correlated in their ranks and thus produce identical sorting. The representation we use does not affect 
any of the conclusions. 
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decompose earnings and returns as 1 1/it it it itX P x    and 1it it itR r   , where 
1 1 1/ [ ] /it it it it it itx X P E X P    , 1 1 1[ ] /it it it itE X P    , 1[ ]it it it itr R E R   and 1 1[ ]it it itE R   . 
The following model addresses the asymmetric timeliness of earnings in incorporating 
news: 
 0 1 0 1( 0) ( 0)*it it it it it itx D r r D r r            (4) 
where all variables are defined above. The slope coefficients that minimize the sum of squared 
residuals are as follows:  
0






   , and 1
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)
var( | 0) var( | 0)
it it it it it it
it it it it
r x r r x r
r r r r
       (4a, 4b) 
In contrast, the slope coefficients that minimize the sum of squared errors in equation (1) are: 
1
0 0 0
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0) ,
var( | 0) var( | 0)
it it it it it it
it it it it
R x R R Rb
R R R R
       




cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0)
var( | 0) var( | 0)
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0) .
var( | 0) var( | 0)
it it it it it it
it it it it
it it it it it it
it it it it
R x R R x Rb
R R R R
R R R R
R R R R
    
    
     

 (5b) 
Comparing equations (4a) and (4b) with equations (5a) and (5b) shows that failure to 
control for the expected components of earnings and returns is likely to bias Basu model 
estimates of how earnings incorporates the unexpected component of returns. The bias can be 
decomposed into two factors. First, and most importantly for present purposes, the confounding 
parameters 0 and 1 will differ from zero due to any cross-sectional relation between expected 
earnings and expected returns. The focus of this paper is on demonstrating the existence of such 
a relation, its effect on Basu model estimates, and solutions to the problem. Second, holding 
expected earnings constant, ߚ෨଴ and ߚ෨ଵ are biased estimates of ߚ଴ and  ߚଵ due to an errors-in-
variables problem caused by using observed return ܴ to measure the economic news variable ݎ, 
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which it does with error. To a large degree we would expect this problem to be mitigated by  
controls for expected earnings, or more crudely by a fixed effects specification, both of which we 
implement below. 
A related issue is whether an errors-in-variables problem also is caused by failing to 
decompose returns into shocks to expected returns (discount rates) and shocks to cash flows 
(e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1988a,b; Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). Both shocks can be 
market-wide or idiosyncratic.  We view the various ways in which accounting rules and practices 
respond to different types of shock as determining the natural properties of accounting income, 
and consequently as affecting the true values of the Basu regression slopes. Conversely, we do 
not view the existence of different types of shock as giving rise to a measurement error problem 
that requires correction. For example, mark-to-market accounting (as in the case of marketable 
securities) contemporaneously incorporates both types of shock in earnings, and implies 
relatively high Basu slopes.  In contrast, historical cost accounting implies relatively low Basu 
slopes because it incorporates shocks to cash flows with a lag (when the cash flows are realized, 
as modified by accruals) and incorporates shocks to expected returns only when debt is 
refinanced or after new investments are made with a changed hurdle rate that implies a shock to 
the cost of equity capital. Lower-of-cost-or-market accounting implies asymmetric Basu slopes. 
We view these as the types of effects that the Basu model, in which accounting income is the 
dependent variable, is designed to capture, and do not view them as a measurement error issue.7 
Based on the analysis above, we conclude the following: 
1. The parameters ܾ଴ and  ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ are biased estimators of the sensitivity of earnings to 
good and bad economic news, i.e., ߚ଴ and ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ.  
2. The incremental slope coefficient ܾଵ is a biased estimator of the degree of asymmetry in 
how the bad and good news components of stock return are reflected in earnings, i.e., ߚଵ. 
                                                 
7 See also the analysis of information about growth options in Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2011). 
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The main source of bias arises when the confounding parameter ߠଵ ് 0 due to non-
linearity in the cross-sectional relation between the expected earnings and returns.  
The confounding parameters 0 ,  and 1 will generally not equal zero if expected earnings 
and returns exhibit any cross-sectional relation. As discussed below, in a cross-section of firms, 
1 1 1cov( , ) cov( , )it it it itR      is unlikely to equal zero for various reasons. Furthermore, the 
relation between 1it   and 1it  is likely to be non-linear, and the covariance between the expected 
components of earnings and returns is expected to vary across groups of companies with 
different characteristics. More specifically, 1 1cov( , | )it it itR    is likely to vary with itR , in which 
case 1 0   and the asymmetric timeliness coefficient will exhibit bias. 
We conjecture that a non-linear relation between the expected values of earnings and 
returns occurs due to two offsetting effects. First, a positive effect on the relation between 1it 
and 1it  arises because expected stock return and expected earnings per share scaled by price 
jointly reflect underlying economic factors (Ball 1978). 8  This effect is likely to be dominant in 
mature companies without substantial growth, where accounting income better reflects 
underlying economic factors.  Second, the effect on reported earnings of accounting rules for 
revenue recognition and expensing are not independent of firm characteristics and, in turn, of 
expected returns. Other things equal firms making increased investments incur earnings-
decreasing expenses under accounting rules (e.g., R&D), but have higher expected stock returns 
(Penman and Zhang, 2002; Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique, 2004), generating a negative effect 
                                                 
8 Earnings scaled by book value of shareholders’ equity reflects the average ex post rate of return on equity. Scaling 
earnings by the number of shares and then by price transforms the variable into a proxy for ex ante expected stock 
return (otherwise known as the cost of equity capital), because it controls for the capitalized value of earnings in 
excess (positive or negative) of the cost of equity capital. This proxy is likely to be more accurate for firms whose 
earnings are less affected by revenue recognition and expensing rules and practices.  
11 
of the relation between 1it  and 1it  . We conjecture that these opposing effects combine to 
produce a non-linear relation between expected earnings and expected returns. 
In Section 4.4 below, we report that there in fact is a non-linear relation between average 
earnings and average returns, which we interpret as evidence of a non-linear relation between 
their expected values. In Section 4.5 we show that controlling for this confounding effect 
essentially eliminates the bias observed by PT. This also implies that the source of bias is a 
confounding non-linear relation between the expected components of earnings and returns (as 
distinct from their news components) as opposed to scale.   
2.3. Why does past earnings exhibit a non-linear relation with returns? When PT 
substitute past earnings for current earnings in the Basu regression, they find that the incremental 
coefficient on negative returns is significant and positive, which they conclude to be inconsistent 
with conditional conservatism: 
“Note that a strong correlation between lagged and current earnings does not alter this 
conclusion. That is, even though lagged earnings are related to current earnings, which 
are in turn related to current news, lagged earnings cannot be related to current news. 
This is because news can only reflect surprises.” 
 
We propose that lagged earnings is a proxy for expected earnings and expected returns, not for 
news. 
To explore this possibility, we start by defining 1/ ,it it i itX P v    where itv is a noise 
component that is unrelated to next-period returns. The OLS regression coefficient 1b in the 
specification adopted by PT then is given by: 
1 1
cov( , | 0) cov( , | 0) .
var( | 0) var( | 0)
it i it it i it
it it it it
R R R Rb
R R R R
                                                          (6) 
We show below that the correlation between current and past earnings is substantial. 
Thus, lagged earnings proxies for expected earnings and hence the incremental coefficient on 
negative returns in a lagged-earnings regression, like the coefficient in the standard unlagged 
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specification, also reflects the cross-section correlation between expected earnings and 
(expected) returns. Failure by researchers to control for the expectation components therefore 
introduces a cross-sectional bias in the Basu estimator of conditional conservatism.  The sign and 
magnitude of the bias depend on the sign and magnitude of the relation between expected 
earnings and returns.   
2.4. How can the bias be ameliorated?  To eliminate the bias in conditional conservatism 
parameters, it is thus necessary to control for the expected components of earnings and returns.  
We first describe the method used to account for expected returns, which is a portfolio based 
approach similar to those used in studies that measure long-term abnormal stock performance. 
We then discuss the three different methods used to control for expected earnings. 
Computing unexpected return. Fama and French (1992, 1993) find that size and book-to-
market ratios are the most important determinants in the cross-section of firms’ expected returns, 
and that other variables such as beta, leverage, and earnings-to-price ratios add limited 
explanatory power.  Based on these findings, computations of unexpected returns in long-horizon 
event studies typically are based on size and market-to-book portfolios (e.g., Brock, Lakonishok, 
and LeBaron, 1992; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Barber and Lyon, 1997, 
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999). However, we are not aware of an accepted way of compute 
unexpected annual returns and for the population of firms.  We adopt a portfolio-based approach 
based on the Fama-French findings and similar to that of Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999).  Each 
year we construct 5×5 reference portfolios by sorting observations on size and book-to-market. 
We compute the average return for each portfolio and use it as a measure of expected return for 
the firms in a given portfolio (see section 4 for additional details).  
Estimating expected returns over a horizon as long as a year is a difficult task (e.g., 
Kothari and Warner, 1997). Because the errors in estimating expected returns are likely to be 
13 
correlated with expected earnings and hence cause the bias to not be completely eliminated, it 
also is important to isolate and control for the expected component of earnings. Fortunately, this 
is likely to be easier to achieve than isolating the expected component of returns, because returns 
have considerably higher levels of volatility).  
Computing unexpected earnings. Our hypothesis is that cross-sectional correlation 
between the expected components of earnings and returns introduces an omitted variable when 
estimating the relation between their unexpected components. We therefore offer three 
comparatively simple and commonly-used methods of addressing this problem: control for firm 
characteristics that are related to the expected components of earnings (and returns); use an 
expectations model to remove the expected components; and isolate firm fixed-effects in 
earnings. 
Approach 1: One approach is to simply add to the Basu regression those controls for firm 
characteristics that are likely to determine expected earnings and expected returns. These include 
size (measured by log of price per share and market capitalization), book-to-market ratio, stock 
price volatility, and leverage. These controls isolate the variation in earnings that is orthogonal to 
the specified firm characteristics and, to the extent the characteristics successfully proxy for 
expectations, this approach isolates unexpected earnings and unexpected returns.9 However, 
because the specified firm characteristics do not fully explain expected returns, they are not 
expected to fully eliminate evidence of bias.  
Approach 2: Within each year and 2 digit SIC code, we estimate a simple first order auto-
regressive expectation model for earnings and use it to compute unexpected earnings.  Timely 
loss recognition practices imply, and prior research shows, that losses are less persistent than 
                                                 
9 Because these variables are measured ex ante, they do not control for the unexpected components of earnings or 
returns, consistent with the arguments in Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev (2010). 
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profits (e.g., Basu 1997). Consequently, we allow for differential persistence between positive 
and negative earnings and estimate the following earnings expectation model:  
1 0 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1/ ( 0) / ( 0) /it it it it it it it it itX P D X X P D X X P x                               (7)  
where itx is the unexpected earnings component. An advantage of this method is that it can be 
estimated in cross-section and does not require a long time series of earnings.  A drawback is that 
the method assumes that the expectation model is the same for all firms in each industry.   
Approach 3: We next consider a simple case where earnings expectations are time 
invariant but differ across companies.  While this is a considerable simplification of reality, our 
analysis suggests that it is powerful enough to essentially eliminate the bias.   In this case the 
expectation represents a fixed effect in earnings:  
it i itX x  ,  (8) 
Two common ways to deal with firm specific effects are (i) differencing and (ii) inclusion 
of fixed effects into the regression.  Both methods yield econometrically consistent estimates of 
the parameters of interest (Greene 2003) and we report below that they yield similar results.  
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
We use the intersection of the Compustat (Merged Fundamental Annual File) and CRSP 
databases and limit the sample to the period 1963-2010.10 To replicate the analysis in PT (Table 
3), we impose the following data requirements each firm-year t: (i) beginning of period price not 
less than $1; (ii) earnings before extraordinary items available for three consecutive years, t, t – 
1, and t – 2; (iii) price per share and number of shares outstanding available at the end of periods 
t – 1, and t – 2, and (iv) market adjusted stock return available for year t.  To compute market 
adjusted returns, raw stock returns are compounded over 12 month periods ending 3 months after 
                                                 
10 The sample construction in PT is based on an older version of Compustat, but we closely replicate their results.  
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the fiscal year end and are subsequently adjusted by subtracting the 12-month return on a value-
weighted market index compounded over the same period.  
To perform further tests we impose additional data requirements as necessary. Our 
analysis in Table 3 employs control variables, which requires non-missing values for book value 
of shareholders equity and total liabilities measured at the end of year t – 1 as well as the 
standard deviation of 12 monthly stock returns measured over the year t – 1. This reduces the 
number of observations, but does not materially affect the basic results.  
The analysis in Table 4 further requires non-missing proxies for unexpected returns and 
unexpected earnings. A proxy for unexpected returns is computed based on 5×5 reference 
portfolios formed by sorting observations annually on market capitalization at the end of year t – 
1 and then on book-to-market ratio.  We calculate monthly value weighted average returns for 
each portfolio to estimate the expected return for stocks in this portfolio, and require a minimum 
of 10 non-missing return observations per portfolio in a given month. Unexpected returns are 
calculated by subtracting the estimated expected returns from raw returns, with both 
compounded over 12-monthly periods ending 3 months after the firm’s fiscal year end. To 
estimate unexpected earnings we follow the industry-based procedure described in Section 2 and 
require a minimum of 10 observations per industry each year. The fixed effect analysis in Table 
5 no longer requires non-missing control variables, but instead requires non-missing earnings in 
year t – 3 to ensure a minimum of at least two observations per firm in all specifications.  
All tests are based on variables that are truncated at both tails of the distribution using 1% 
cutoff values.  Our analysis is based on samples ranging between 133,237 and 162,119 firm-year 
observations, depending on the data requirements described above.  The number of observations 
is reported in each table, and is limited to the most restrictive model within that table to hold the 
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sample constant across different model specifications.  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for 
the variables used in subsequent analyses.   
4.  Evaluation of scale as a source of bias. 
We first replicate the basic results reported by PT in our slightly larger sample, and 
observe the same evidence consistent with scale-related effects. We then provide a refutable test 
of the scale effects hypothesis, which it fails, so we conclude that the explanation must lie 
elsewhere.  
4.1. Replicating the basic results. The first intriguing result in PT occurs when they 
replace period price-deflated earnings per share as the dependent variable in the Basu regression 
with the inverse of lagged price (the scalar for both earnings and returns), and show that the “bad 
news” proxy exhibits a significantly negative incremental coefficient. This result is attributed to 
a “variance effect.”  The second intriguing result comes when past earnings is substituted for 
current earnings in the pooled Basu regression, and the estimated coefficient on “bad news” is 
positive.  That is, past earnings predict future returns, and the relation depends on the sign of 
future returns.  This seemingly-anomalous result is attributed to a combination of the “variance 
effect” and an additional “loss effect” due to a positive correlation between price and the level of 
price-deflated earnings.     
To replicate these results, we run the following regression using pooled cross-sectional 
and time series data: 
 0 1 0 1( 0) ( 0)t t t t tDependent variable D Ret Ret D Ret Ret            (9) 
where Dependent variable is one of the dependent variables, such as current (lagged) earnings 
deflated by price, ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ (ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ); ܴ݁ݐ௧ is market-adjusted 12-month return; and ܦሺ. ሻ is an 
indicator variable.  We omit the subscript ݅ that identifies individual companies for brevity.  
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Table 2 reports the results, which correspond to Table 3 in PT.  Test statistics are based 
on the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, hence the table shows mean coefficients and their 
corresponding t-statistics from the distribution of yearly coefficient estimates.  The model in row 
(1) of the table shows coefficients based on the Basu specification with ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ as the dependent 
variable in Equation (9). The estimated coefficients ߚ଴ and ߚଵ are statistically significant, and 
equal 0.017 and 0.249 (giving a total loss-year effect of 0.265), respectively.  The magnitudes of 
the coefficients are similar to those in Basu (1997).   
Row (2) of Table 2 presents an analogous model with the dependent variable replaced by 
lagged earnings, ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ. The estimated coefficients ߚ଴ and ߚଵ in this specification are -0.036 
and 0.148 (total effect of 0.112), respectively. Both are statistically significant, with Fama-
MacBeth t-values of -10.7 and +14.5.  Similarly, when the dependent variable is replaced by 
ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ, in row (3) of Table 2, the coefficients ߚ଴ and ߚଵ are -0.035 and 0.135 (total effect of 
0.010), respectively, and remain significant, with Fama-MacBeth t-values of -12.1 and +12.6.  
While the total effect ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ in the lagged model is economically significant and over 40 
percent of its equivalent for the original Basu model in row (1), the R-squared is only 4 percent. 
This suggests that R-squareds, which in some cases are used to evaluate the overall timeliness of 
earnings with respect to economic news, are relatively immune to the bias.   Nevertheless, the 
findings in rows (2) and (3) are anomalous, and consistent with bias in the Basu estimator of 
conditional conservatism.  
To support their argument that scale effects drive these results, PT make two steps.  First, 
they fix earnings at 1 and use 1/ ௧ܲିଵ as the dependent variable in model (9) to test the variance 
effect hypothesis.11 Row (4) of Table 2 reports coefficient estimates ߚ଴ and ߚଵ for this model of 
0.078 and -0.218, respectively, which are statistically significant with Fama-MacBeth t-values of 
                                                 
11 This substitution is not meaningful under the null hypothesis that the Basu (1997) model is well specified, because 
the error term then includes ሺ1 െ ܺ௧ሻ/ ௧ܲିଵ, which is correlated with the regressors under the null. This may partly 
render the findings in PT spurious rather than indicative of bias. 
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+13.2 and -13.0.  This evidence is consistent with the variance effect, suggesting that beginning 
of period stock price and the variance of returns are inversely related.12  Moreover, higher 
positive returns are more indicative of a lower stock price than are negative returns of similar 
magnitude.  Second, it is argued that combining this pattern with an inverse relation between loss 
frequency and price is likely to explain the spurious evidence of conservatism in rows (2) and (3) 
of the table. We evaluate this explanation in the following subsection. 
4.2. Do scale-related loss and variance effects explain the bias? To examine whether the 
combination of scale effects explains a positive (negative) coefficient on "bad news" ("good 
news") in a regression of lagged price-deflated earnings ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ on current period "good" and 
"bad news," we isolate variation in scale and repeat the analysis. If scale effects are a primary 
reason for the bias, then it should not be present in a group of companies of the same scale.  This 
reasoning forms the basis of our tests of the scale effects explanation. We sort observations 
annually by scale (beginning of period price ௧ܲିଵ) into 50 portfolios of equal size.  This creates 
50 sub-samples, each of which consists of companies of similar scale, because almost all of the 
scale variation is across (as distinct from within) the sub-samples.  In fact, an analysis of 
variance indicates that this procedure eliminates approximately 99% of the total variation in 
scale, measured as log ሺ ௧ܲିଵሻ or 1/ ௧ܲିଵ, leaving only 1% of the total variance within the formed 
portfolios.  We then re-estimate the benchmark lagged-earnings specification within each of the 
50 portfolios, and test whether bias continues to be observed.  
This analysis is summarized in Figure 1.  The figure plots the sum of the coefficients 
ߚ଴൅ߚଵ estimated from variation within each of 50 portfolios, for both the current and lagged 
earnings specifications. The line denoted by 'stars' depicts the coefficients ߚ଴൅ߚଵ based on the 
original Basu (1997) estimator.  The majority of estimates across the 50 portfolios are in the 
                                                 
12 To see this note that the estimates imply that greater deviations of stock returns from the market in either direction 
are on average associated with higher 1/Pt-1 and hence lower price.  
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range of 0.1 to 0.3.  The magnitude of the coefficients is declining as we move towards portfolios 
with higher prices.  Such evidence, however, is not surprising as it is well known that price and 
market capitalization are closely related (e.g., Hawawini and Keim, 2000) and that timely loss 
recognition is expected to be declining in firm size (e.g., Basu 2001; Khan and Watts, 2010).  
The line denoted by ‘dots’ depicts the estimates from Equation (10), where the dependent 
variable is lagged earnings ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ.  Given that we have isolated variation in scale and hence 
largely eliminated the scale effects within each portfolio, the coefficients on negative returns in 
this regression should be approximately equal to zero, if loss and variance effects explain the 
bias. Nevertheless, we find that bias persists in notable magnitudes.  Based on this evidence we 
conclude that scale effects provide an unsatisfactory explanation for the documented irregularity.  
5.  Effect of heterogeneity in earnings and return expectations. 
We argue that the expected components of returns and earnings are heterogeneous 
(primarily in cross-section but also in time-series), and that earnings-returns regression slopes are 
affected by the structure of the correlation between expected earnings and expected returns.  
5.1. Predictability of future market-adjusted returns. We first demonstrate that future 
market adjusted returns can be predicted by both current market adjusted returns and current 
price-deflated earnings. Figures 2A and 2B plot the respective results.  Observations are sorted 
annually into 50 portfolios based on current-period market-adjusted returns in Figure 2A and 
price-deflated earnings in Figure 2B.  In each of these two figures, we plot the average year-
ahead market adjusted return for each of the 50 portfolios.   
The evidence indicates that market-adjusted returns are not a good measure of 
unexpected (abnormal) returns because they are predictable based on prior earnings (Ball 1978) 
and based on prior period stock performance (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). This implies that the 
expected components in earnings are likely to play an important role in the relation between 
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returns and earnings. Furthermore, earnings and returns based “momentum” in returns (Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996) implies that the anomalously significant coefficients in the 
model using lagged earnings as the dependent variable could be a manifestation of a wider 
earnings pricing anomaly (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989).13 
Figures 2A and 2B also provide a strong indication that the expected levels of earnings 
and market-adjusted returns indeed are related in a non-linear fashion in cross section.  This 
evidence is consistent with the argument in Ball (1978) that expected returns and expected 
earnings (scaled by number of shares and by price) share common underlying economic 
determinants. More specifically, the figures suggest that ܿ݋ݒሺߤ௜௧,௜௧ሻ ് 0 and that the effect is 
more pronounced for companies with low returns and earnings. We explore this further in the 
following sub-section. 
5.2. Non-linear relation between expected earnings and expected returns. To demonstrate 
more directly the non-linearity in the cross-sectional relation between the expected components 
of earnings and returns, we induce cross-sectional variation in expected values using known 
important risk factors: size and book-to-market ratio (Fama and French 1992, 1993). Each year 
we partition observations into 5×5 (or 10×5) portfolios based on beginning of period market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratio. For each portfolio we then compute average earnings 
and market-adjusted returns across all years, and provide times-series means as estimators of the 
portfolios’ expected earnings and expected returns (in excess of the market).  
Forming portfolios on the basis of important ex ante risk factors is designed to induce 
cross-sectional variation in expected returns but not in unexpected returns. This design differs 
from the commonly-used firm-level regression of returns on earnings (Freeman and Tse, 1992; 
Das and Lev, 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Beneish and Harvey, 1998), which almost 
                                                 
13 See also Rusticus (2011), who shows a spurious relation between returns and implied cost of capital estimates due 
to return predictability. 
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entirely reflects the relation between the unexpected components of the variables. Our design 
averages earnings outcomes within portfolio, and over time, for portfolios that are not formed on 
the basis of earnings, and hence removes most of the variation in unexpected earnings in order to 
isolate mean effects.  
Using these portfolio-level data, we run a non-parametric regression of estimated 
expected earnings on estimated expected return. This regression accommodates arbitrary non-
linearity in the relation. The estimated regression function is presented in Figure 2C and 
indicates a pronounced non-linearity. For low levels of expected returns, expected earnings and 
expected return are positively related, with slope coefficients close to 1. However, this relation 
reverses for companies with high expected returns.  
We conjecture that this non-linear pattern occurs due to a combination of the offsetting 
effects described in Section 2.2: a positive relation (dominant in mature firms) occurs because 
scaled earnings and average stock return reflect similar underlying economic factors (Ball 1978); 
and a negative relation (dominant in firms making substantial new investment) occurs because 
these are earnings-decreasing activities under accounting rules but are associated with increased 
expected stock returns (Penman and Zhang, 2002; Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique, 2004). We 
conjecture that these opposing effects combine to produce a non-linear relation between expected 
earnings and expected returns.  
The evidence in Figure 2 implies that the non-linear cross-sectional correlation between 
the expected components of earnings and returns leads to non-zero confounding parameters 0
and 1 in equations (5a) and (5b).14 This in turn imparts a bias in conventional Basu estimates. 
                                                 
14 Strictly speaking, Figure 2 reveals a non-linear relation between the sample means of returns and earnings, not 
their population means. Nevertheless, this is the relation that holds in the sample data and which underlies the 
anomalous evidence of a non-linear relation between returns and lagged earnings.  
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5.3. Correcting the cross-sectional heterogeneity bias. We implement three relatively 
simple and widely-used approaches to isolate the expected components in earnings, and show 
empirically that these methods substantially reduce or eliminate the bias. We also implement 
several methods of isolating the expected components of returns, which has a lesser effect (due 
largely to the greater unpredictability of returns). 
Approach 1: Control for firm characteristics. In Section 2 we propose that without 
controls for the expected components in earnings and returns, estimates of conditional 
conservatism can exhibit bias due to an omitted variables problem.  To examine whether this is 
indeed the case, our first approach augments the Basu regression with ex ante determinants of 
expected earnings and expected returns as proxied by several control variables commonly used 
in the literature (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Khan and 
Watts, 2009):  
0 1 0 1
1
( 0) ( 0)*t t t t
k t t
Dependent variable D Ret Ret D Ret Ret
Controls
   
 
     
   (10) 
where ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ are scale, proxied by natural logarithm of price (݈݋݃ሺܲሻ) and market 
capitalization (log ሺܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ሻ), book-to-market ratio (ܾ/݉), ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁, and return ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ, 
all of which are measured as of year ݐ െ1. This model controls for the expected components of 
earnings and returns in a parsimonious fashion (the controls are not interacted with the negative 
return indicator variable) without directly relying on proxies for unexpected returns or earnings, 
but as we report below it performs reasonably well in addressing the bias.  
Table 3 presents results from re-estimating the specifications presented earlier in Table 2, 
with the controls added. In this augmented Basu (1997) model, presented in row (1) of Table 3, 
the estimated coefficients ߚଵ and ߚ଴൅ߚଵ remain both sizable in magnitude (0.183 and 0.224) and 
statistically significant (Fama-MacBeth t-statistics of 15.7 and 16.4). Arguably, the coefficient 
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estimates are more consistent with reasonable priors than those obtained from standard Basu 
regressions, as in Table 2. For example, in Table 2 the ߚ଴൅ߚଵ estimate of timely loss recognition 
is 15.6 times the β0 estimate of timely gain recognition, which seems unreasonably high, but the 
ratio falls to 5.5 times when controls are added in Table 3. The ratio falls even further with better 
controls for the expected components of returns and earnings, reported below.  
In rows (2) and (3), where the dependent variable is lagged earnings, the estimates of ߚଵ 
ߚ଴൅ߚଵ are reduced substantially by adding these few control variables. For the model based on 
ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ the sum ߚ଴൅ߚଵ falls from 0.112 in Table 2 to only 0.043 when controls are added, 
while for the model based on ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ it reduces from 0.10 to 0.033. While statistically 
significant, the coefficients are substantially reduced in economic significance. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of control variables almost fully eliminates the “variance effect” in row (4): with 
1/ ௧ܲିଵ as the dependent variable, adding controls reduces the magnitude of ߚଵ from -0.218 in 
Table 2 to -0.006 in Table 3, and ߚ଴൅ߚଵ from -0.141 to -0.004, rendering them economically and 
(in case of the total effect) statistically insignificant.   
Based on these findings, we conclude that adding a small number of control variables 
commonly used in the literature successfully deals with any scale effects and to large extent 
removes the bias in standard Basu (1997) estimates. This implies that bias is largely driven by 
cross-sectional heterogeneity. Because these control variables are only proxies for the unknown 
true determinants of expected earnings, a more comprehensive or more descriptive set of controls 
could be expected to remove even more of the bias.  Next, we examine alternative ways to deal 
with the issue.  
Approach 2: Expectations model to control for expected earnings and expected returns. 
Under this approach, as well as Approach 3 discussed further, we attempt to isolate the expected 
components of both earnings and returns. In both approaches, returns are adjusted for two risk 
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factors, size and book-to-market, based on the evidence of Fama and French (1992, 1993). While 
these factors are unlikely to fully eliminate return expectations, the evidence is that they are 
powerful explanatory variables for mean returns and thus we expect them to lower the degree of 
bias in estimating the Basu model.   
To demonstrate that this in fact occurs, we specify ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ as the dependent variable in 
model (9), which we then estimate successively using raw returns, market-adjusted returns, and 
finally size and book-to-market adjusted returns, while holding scale constant to isolate its 
effects.  We expect these adjustments to returns to provide progressively better measurements of 
unexpected returns and, if our hypothesis that failure to control for cross-sectional differences in 
expected returns and earnings biasing the standard Basu estimator is correct, we expect the bias 
to progressively fall. The results are summarized graphically in Figure 3, which depicts the total 
effect β0+β1. The figure indicates the bias is most pronounced when the Basu model uses raw 
returns (denoted by ‘stars’). The bias falls somewhat using market adjusted returns (denoted by 
‘stars’) and falls even further as returns are adjusted for the two risk factors.  The results in 
Figure 3 are after adjusting in various ways for expected returns only.  
Table 4, Panel A then reports results after also adjusting earnings for its expected 
component by estimating Equation (7) within each year and 2-digit SIC industry code, and then 
using the residuals from this model to measure unexpected earnings.  We use this measure of 
unexpected earnings and its lagged counterpart as dependent variables. Returns are adjusted for 
the two risk factors, as discussed above. 
The additional data requirements reduce the sample size, so to facilitate comparison we 
first re-estimate the contemporary and lagged earnings specifications reported earlier in rows (1) 
and (2) of Table 2, replacing raw returns with size and book-to-market adjusted returns.  These 
estimates are presented in rows (1) and (2) of Table 4. As expected, in comparison with their 
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equivalents in Table 2 the slope coefficients are somewhat lower when the expected component 
of returns is removed by adjusting for size and book-to-market factors.   
Rows (3) and (4) of Table 4 then demonstrate the additional effect of removing the 
expected component of earnings. Using size and book-to-market adjusted returns as in row (1), 
row (3) presents results where the dependent variable is contemporaneous earnings less its 
expected component, ሺܺ௧ െ ܧሾܺ௧ሿሻ/ ௧ܲିଵ, estimated from the industry-based model. The 
estimated coefficients ߚଵ and ߚ଴൅ߚଵ are 0.117 and 0.157, respectively, and are statistically 
significant.  The magnitudes are lower than the Basu specification estimates of 0.229 and 0.251 
in row (1), consistent with bias due to failure to isolate expected earnings.  Row (4) presents 
results where the dependent variable is lagged earnings adjusted for its expected component, 
ሺܺ௧ିଵ െ ܧሾܺ௧ିଵሿሻ/ ௧ܲିଶ. The coefficients ߚଵ and ߚ଴൅ߚଵ now are only 0.031 and 0.028, 
respectively. The estimate for ߚଵ is one-fifth of its equivalent in row (2) when earnings is not 
adjusted for its expected component and, while it is statistically significant, its economic 
magnitude is small.  
Finally, Panel B of Table 4 estimates a model with additional controls for firm 
characteristics. The dependent variable in row (5) of Panel B is ሺܺ௧ െ ܧሾܺ௧ሿሻ/ ௧ܲିଵ, which 
corresponds to the results in rows (1) and (3) of Panel (A) in the absence of control variables. 
The asymmetric timeliness estimates of β1 and ߚ଴൅ߚଵ (0.124 and 0.162, respectively) are largely 
unchanged from their comparable row (3) estimates. In the lagged-earnings specification with 
 ሺܺ௧ିଵ െ ܧሾ ܺ௧ିଵሿሻ/ ௧ܲିଶ as the dependent variable presented in row (6), β1 and ߚ଴൅ߚଵ decrease 
to 0.013 and 0.014, respectively, when controls are added. Economically, these magnitudes 
hardly compare to that of the estimated asymmetric timeliness coefficient, and exhibit little bias. 
Overall, our analysis again suggests that the bias in Basu estimates can be attributed largely to 
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the cross-sectional correlation between expected earnings and expected returns and can be 
addressed in the usual way with appropriate controls. 
Approach 3: Using unexpected returns and using firm fixed effects to control for expected 
earnings.  Similar results are observed when firm fixed effects are used to control for expected 
earnings, either through differencing or fixed effects regression. These methods have an 
advantage over our second approach in that they do not rely on a parameterized expectation 
model. Instead they control for cross-sectional differences in expected earnings by making the 
simplifying assumption that expectations are time invariant.  In this case panel data techniques, 
including differencing and fixed effects regressions, can be used to isolate the effect of expected 
earnings when estimating asymmetric timeliness.  We follow this approach and present the 
results in Table 5.  Because we do not require control variables and industry based measures of 
unexpected earnings, the sample size increases. The first two rows of the table replicate the main 
prior results for this sample.   
We begin by differencing earnings as one way of eliminating their fixed effect 
components (note that we do not difference returns as they are already adjusted). Results are 
presented in rows (3) and (4) of Table 5. Row (3) presents estimates when the dependent variable 
is contemporaneous change in earnings scaled by beginning price, ሺܺ௧ െ ܺ௧ିଵሻ/ ௧ܲିଵ. The 
estimated coefficients ߚଵ and ߚ଴൅ߚଵ are 0.093 and 0.152. While remaining statistically 
significant, these coefficient magnitudes are substantially lower than their counterparts of 0.234 
and 0.254 for the standard (undifferenced) Basu regression in row (1).  Row (4) presents the 
analogous model employing the lagged earnings benchmark, with the dependent variable 
specified as lagged change in earnings, ሺܺ௧ିଵ െ ܺ௧ିଶሻ/ ௧ܲିଶ. The estimated coefficients ߚଵ and 
ߚ଴൅ߚଵ of -0.001 and 0.006 now are economically tiny and statistically indistinguishable from 
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zero.  In other words, the bias does not survive differencing of earnings as a means of controlling 
for expected earnings.  
We next exploit fixed effect regression analysis.   Instead of including firm-dummies, 
which can be computationally intensive for a large panel, we perform a simple transformation 
where we subtract each firm’s own mean from its earnings observations.15  This also allows 
computation of Fama-MacBeth test statistics, as in prior tests. Specifically, from annual cross-
sectional regressions of earnings deviations from their firm-specific means on size and book-to-
market adjusted returns, we compute average regression coefficients and their standard errors.  
The estimates based on this procedure are presented in rows (5) to (7) of Table 5.  Similar to the 
above analysis based on earnings changes, when the dependent variable is deviations of 
contemporary earnings from the firm-specific means, the coefficients ߚଵ and ߚ଴൅ߚଵ are 
statistically significant and equal 0.093 and 0.137.  However, when the dependent variable is one 
year lagged earnings and fixed effects are eliminated, row (6) indicates that the coefficients are 
close to zero in magnitude and the total effect is no longer statistically significant (Fama-
MacBeth t-statistics of 2.75 and 1.42).   Row (7) shows the model when the dependent variable is 
two year lagged scaled earnings less firm fixed effects. The estimated coefficients are somewhat 
lower than in row (6) and hardly exhibit any bias. This analysis confirms our earlier conclusion 
that the bias is explained by the presence of a correlated omitted mean effects, which are 
comparatively straightforward to remove.   
5.4. Summary. Bias in the standard Basu regression estimator of conditional conservatism 
is substantially reduced by controls for commonly-used firm characteristics and is further 
reduced by controls for expected earnings and expected returns. A simple firm fixed-effects 
regression essentially eliminates the bias. Because these results are obtained in a panel of pooled 
                                                 
15 A fixed effects estimator by construction subtracts from each observation of the dependent variable its 
firm/subject specific mean value. Doing so eliminates between firms/subjects cross-sectional variation and identifies 
the effect of changes in the variable.  
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cross-section and time-series observations, the success of the firm fixed effects specification 
implies that the bias is primarily cross-sectional in nature, due mainly to variation in risk across 
firms rather than to variation in risk or in risk premia over time. This helps explain why the 
practice of adjusting earnings and returns by subtracting their market components, as in Ball and 
Brown (1968) and Basu (1997, Table 1 Panel B), is not sufficient, because it implicitly assumes 
the variation in expected returns is entirely cross-temporal and not cross-sectional in character.   
6. Additional Analyses. 
6.1. Time-series variation in conditional conservatism.  In their Figure 3, PT show that 
estimated Basu (1997) coefficients are correlated over time with the equivalent coefficients when 
the dependent variable is lagged earnings.  They conclude from this co-movement that much of 
the variation in asymmetric timeliness estimates must be spurious.  We believe such a conclusion 
is premature for three main reasons. First, co-movement can be partly driven by failure to 
properly control for omitted variables. Second, some co-movement takes place mechanically, by 
construction of OLS estimates using the same set of regressors.  For example, mere randomness 
in the regressors’ common denominator (notably, noise in the share price) introduces a degree of 
co-movement between estimates from the contemporaneous and lagged earnings specifications.  
Third, at a more basic level, it is straightforward to show that, because the residuals in the 
models for current and lagged earnings are correlated, the two sets of parameters will share a 
correlation of similar magnitude.  To illustrate this point, Figure 4 plots time series of estimates 
of ߚ଴൅ߚଵ from two models: (1) a model based on the proxies for current unexpected earnings 
and unexpected returns (depicted with stars) and (2) a model based on unexpected lagged 
earnings (depicted by dots). While the model based on lagged earnings shows no evidence of 
systematic bias, the estimates from both models exhibit co-movement. Again, such co-movement 
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is fully expected from statistics viewpoint and thus we conclude that the evidence of co-
movement is expected and does not invalidate the methodology discussed here.  
6.2. Bias and cross-sectional firm characteristics.  Our analysis in Section 2 suggests that 
bias in the estimates of asymmetric timeliness is likely to vary with firm characteristics. Indeed, 
PT find that three firm characteristics (size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage) seem to induce 
variation in the bias. They use this result to question the validity of the conditional conservatism 
scores developed by Khan and Watts (2010), as well as to question the inferences from prior 
studies that explain the variation of conditional conservatism with book-to-market, firm size and 
leverage based on agency theory arguments.  In contrast, our arguments suggest that such 
findings are simply a result of failure to control for determinants of expected earnings. Thus we 
revisit the issue here.   
We partition the sample into 50 equally sized portfolios by independent sorts on each of 
the three firm characteristics, measured as of the beginning of the current period.  For each 
portfolio, we estimate the Basu (1997) model and its lagged earnings counterpart using proxies 
for unexpected returns and unexpected earnings (current and lagged), augmented for the basic 
control variables as in Table 4. For convenience, we present the results graphically. Figures 5A, 
5B, and 5C provide estimates of the total effect ߚ଴൅ߚଵ based on Equation (10) for each of the 50 
portfolios formed on size (market capitalization), book-to-market, and leverage, respectively. In 
all three figures, 'stars' and 'dots' depict estimates where the dependent variable is ሺܺ௧ െ
ܧሺܺ௧ሻሻ/ ௧ܲିଵ and (ܺ௧ିଵ െ ܧሺܺ௧ିଵሻሻ/ ௧ܲିଶ, respectively.  
We find that the coefficient estimates for contemporaneous unexpected earnings decrease 
in firm size, and increase in book-to-market and leverage, consistent with prior literature 
(Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Khan and Watts, 2009) and with the analytical arguments in 
Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2011).  The estimates reach fairly high magnitudes in some 
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portfolios, substantially in excess of the original Basu (1997) whole-sample estimates.  In 
contrast, when lagged unexpected earnings is the dependent variable, we do not observe 
systematic variation in the estimated coefficients ߚ଴൅ߚଵ across size, book-to-market, and 
leverage portfolios.  Instead, the estimates fluctuate around their means slightly above zero and 
exhibit no bias. Similar results are found when we use earnings changes to proxy for their 
unexpected component.  
This evidence is consistent with the conclusion that asymmetric timeliness estimates vary 
with the firm characteristics of size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage because they are natural 
determinants of expected earnings and returns.  Fortunately, controlling for firm characteristics 
correlated with expected earnings and returns is straightforward to deal with empirically. 
7.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
We show that conventional Basu (1997) regression coefficients are biased estimators of 
the relation between the unexpected “news” components of earnings and returns, due to a cross-
sectional relation between their expected components. In particular, conventional estimates of 
asymmetry in how economic news is incorporated in earnings are biased by a non-linear relation 
between expected earnings and expected returns. For the researcher focusing on news, this 
relation confounds the Basu estimator unless controlled for.  
This bias was identified by Patatoukas and Thomas (2011). They attributed the bias to 
scale-related effects and discouraged researchers from using Basu (1997) regression coefficients, 
which we regard as excessively alarmist.  We provide evidence that scale is not the issue, and 
that the problem arises from a (non-linear) correlation between the expected (as distinct from 
news) components of earnings and returns. The nature of the bias therefore does not seem to be 
conceptually different from one arising from an omitted correlated variable.  Omitted variables 
are a common and well-recognized issue in the empirical literature generally. How to deal with 
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this problem empirically also is well understood (Greene 2003, Chapter 13).  We show that bias 
essentially disappears when firm-specific effects in earnings are taken into account or other 
simple methods are employed.  Advising against using the Basu (1997) measure of asymmetric 
timeliness, without offering any meaningful alternative, is unlikely to positively benefit 
empirical research.   
We offer several simple ways to improve on the standard Basu (1997) specification to 
address the bias.  Both an uncomplicated control for a small number of well-known risk factors 
determining expected values, and a relatively crude way of removing the expected components 
of firms’ earnings, substantially reduce bias and increase confidence in estimates of asymmetric 
timeliness.  Furthermore, a simple inclusion of firm fixed effects essentially eliminates the bias, 
which becomes insignificant.  After implementing these controls, the estimate of asymmetric 
timeliness remains statistically and economically significant. The estimates are reduced in 
magnitude, and arguably are more consistent with reasonable priors. They also behave as a 
predictable function of market-to-book, size and leverage. It would be surprising if these results 
did not occur. Conditional conservatism accords with the long-standing accounting principle of 
anticipating losses but not gains, with specific asymmetric accounting rules such as the lower-of-
cost-or-market method for inventories and the rules for impairment of long term assets, and with 
loss recognition practices that occurred prior to the promulgation of formal rules. 
Some previous annual-horizon research designs have implemented limited controls for 
expected returns and expected earnings. Ball and Brown (1968, pp. 161-163) attempt to control 
for expected earnings and returns by differencing earnings and by subtracting their respective 
market factors. Basu (1997, Table 1 Panel B) subtracts the market factor in returns for one set of 
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results.16 We show that subtracting ex post market factors is not sufficient when estimating 
conditional conservatism, and that failure to control for cross-sectional differences in expected 
earnings and expected returns, under a fairly general set of assumptions, can indeed bias the 
estimate. However, we show empirically that differencing earnings works well in this context as 
a control for expected earnings.  
The conclusion drawn in PT (p. 9 for example) that bias in the Basu estimator is a result 
of truncation, as advocated in Dietrich et al. (2007), in our view is not valid.  First, it is at best 
unclear how the sample truncation argument in Dietrich et al. is related to the scale effects 
argument in PT, because they are different effects. Second, Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev (2011) 
demonstrate that sample truncation does not give rise to bias in a context where the unexpected 
(news) components of earnings and returns have been isolated, and we conclude from the 
analysis and evidence reported in the present paper that the problem is due to correlation 
between the expected values of the variables, not truncation. Thus, the issue has little in common 
with sample truncation. Third, Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev (2011) argue that the procedure 
Dietrich et al. employ to support the truncation bias hypothesis is invalid. 17   
                                                 
16 These are the two prominent annual-horizon research designs in the literature; the issue is less relevant in short-
window “announcement effect” studies. Basu (1997, p.10) motivates controlling for the market factor on efficiency 
grounds, rather than on the need to control for expected values. 
17 Dietrich et al. offer the following empirical procedure, which they refer to as a “simulation,” to test their sample 
truncation bias hypothesis. First, they regress returns ܴ௜௧ on earnings and save the residuals ߬௜௧ and predicted values ෠ܴ௜௧. Second, they construct synthetic returns by matching firms’ predicted values with randomly selected residuals 
of other firms, such that ܴ௜௧ௌ ൌ ෠ܴ௜௧ ൅ ߬௞௧ and k ≠ i. Third, using these synthetic returns they obtain significant 
coefficients on negative returns in the Basu regression, which they argue is direct evidence of bias. This procedure is 
not strictly a simulation, and is akin to bootstrapping. It can be expected to show similar results to those obtained 
from actual returns, and does not provide new evidence of truncation bias. Because earnings is left-skewed under 
conditional conservatism, in their regression of returns on earnings the residual ߬௜௧ is overrepresented by large 
positive values and underrepresented by negative values. Therefore, positive synthetic returns ܴ௜௧ௌ  are less likely to 
be true “good news” for firm i but more likely to be due to positive values of ߬௞௧. In contrast, negative synthetic 
returns are more likely to be due to true “bad news” for firm i than to negative values of ߬௞௧. In other words, the 
procedure uses actual rather than simulated earnings and retains the distributional properties of actual earnings that 
are due to conditional conservatism, and the values of the synthetic returns are still informative about the sign and 
magnitude of (“bad” and “good”) economic news for firm i in year t. Hence, the procedure does not permit a 
conclusion that estimates are biased.  
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The data patterns documented by PT and replicated herein are fully consistent with the 
conclusion of Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2011) that the Basu estimator provides a valid 
measure of conditional conservatism in the form of asymmetric incorporation of the  news in 
stock returns (a proxy for economic income). The typical research objective is to estimate how 
accounting rules and reporting practices filter the stream of value-relevant information (“news”) 
to determine accounting earnings, and in particular the extent to which the accounting filter is 
asymmetric in its timeliness.  The entire Ball et al. (2011) analysis therefore is carried out on the 
unexpected components of earnings and returns. Our result that the bias in the Basu estimator is 
driven by failing to control for expected returns and expected earnings therefore reconciles with 
the conclusion of Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2011) because, by definition, news has no 
expected value.   
Finally, we note that the research objective does not always require the separation of 
changes in economic value into expected and news components. This is more likely to be the 
case when researching the role of conservatism in contracting contexts.  For example, for the 
purpose of implementing a leverage covenant, lenders would seem to be indifferent between 
changes in firm value that are expected and those that are not.18  The original Basu regression is 
well-specified when the research objective does not require separation of the news and expected 
components of returns.  
Overall, we conclude that researchers interested in the incorporation of economic news in 
accounting earnings need to be aware of cross-sectional bias in estimates of conditional 
conservatism and we recommend several straightforward remedies to deal with it. Omitted 
variables are a standard problem in empirical research, and do not imply that all evidence of 
asymmetric timeliness is spurious or that the concept of conditional conservatism in Basu (1997) 
is conceptually flawed.  Hopefully, further research will provide a more solid economic 
                                                 
18 See also Dechow (1994, p.14). 
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explanation for the observed relation between the expected components of returns and earnings, 
and of its effect on components of earnings (notably, cash flow versus accruals) and as a function 
of the measurement interval (quarterly, annual, or longer horizons).    
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Figure 1: Coefficient estimates from regressions of current and lagged earnings on signed 
returns, holding scale effects constant 
 
The figure presents the estimated total effect β1+ β2 based on the model in Equation (9) estimated from pooled time series and 
cross-sectional data for each of 50 portfolios formed by annually sorting observations on beginning of period price ௧ܲିଵ.  The 
lines represented by ‘stars’ and ‘dots’ are based on a model where the dependent variable is current period price-deflated earnings 
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Figure 2: Important properties of expected returns and expected earnings 
 
Figure 2A: Future market adjusted returns conditional on current returns 
 
Period t +1 average market adjusted returns (ܴ݁ݐt+1) for each of 50 portfolios formed by annually sorting on current-period 
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Figure 2B: Future market adjusted returns conditional on current earnings 
 
Period t +1 average market adjusted returns (ܴ݁ݐt+1) for each of 50 portfolios formed by annually sorting on current-period 
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Figure 2C: Non-linearity in the relation between expected returns and expected earnings  
 
To induce cross-sectional variation in expected values, we annually partition observations into 5×5 portfolios based 
on beginning of period market capitalization and book-to-market ratio. Time-series average earnings and average 
market adjusted returns for each portfolio are presented as estimates of the portfolio’s expected earnings and 
expected returns. We estimate a non-parametric regression of estimated expected earnings on estimated expected 
return to accommodate arbitrary non-linearity in the relation between them. The regression line is plotted in this 
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Figure 3: The effect of adjusting returns for their expectation on the bias. 
 
The figure presents the estimated total effect β1+ β2 based on the model in Equation (9) estimated for each of 50 portfolios formed 
by annually sorting on beginning of the period price ௧ܲିଵ.  The dependent variable is one period lagged price deflated 
earningsܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ; the explanatory variables are constructed based on three measures of returns (ܴ݁ݐ௧): raw returns, market 
adjusted returns, and size and book-to-market adjusted returns. The lines represented by ‘stars’, ‘dots’, and ‘circles’ present 
estimates where ܴ݁ݐ௧ is raw returns, market adjusted returns, and size and book-to-market adjusted returns, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Time series of estimates: Controlling for determinants of earnings. 
 
The lines represented by ‘stars’ and ‘dots’ present the time series of annual cross-sectional estimates of the total effect β1+ β2 
from Equation (10) where the dependent variable is current period unexpected earnings and one period lagged unexpected 
earnings, respectively. Unexpected earnings are estimated using the 2-digit SIC industry-based model discussed in Section 2 
(Approach 2). The explanatory variable ܴ݁ݐ௧௔ is size and book-to-market adjusted return. Control variables include scale, book-
to-market, leverage, and volatility 
 
 

























Figure 5A:  Slope coefficients from a regression of current and lagged earnings on signed returns, estimated 
across 50 portfolios based on firm size. 
 
The figure presents estimated coefficients for each of 50 portfolios formed by sorting on beginning of the period market 
capitalization. Regressions are estimated from pooled time series and cross-sectional data for each portfolio. ‘Stars’ and ‘dots’ 
represent estimates of β1+ β2 from Equation (10) where the dependent variable is current period unexpected earnings and one 
period lagged unexpected earnings, respectively. Unexpected earnings are estimated using the 2-digit SIC industry-based model 
discussed in Section 2 (Approach 2). The explanatory variable ܴ݁ݐ௧௔ is size and book-to-market adjusted return. Control variables 
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Figure 5B: Slope coefficients from a regression of current and lagged earnings on signed returns, estimated 
across 50 portfolios based on market-to-book ratio. 
 
The figure presents estimated coefficients for each of 50 portfolios formed by sorting on beginning of the period book-to-
market ratio. Regressions are estimated from pooled time series and cross-sectional data for each portfolio. ‘Stars’ and ‘dots’ 
represent estimates of β1+ β2 from Equation (10) where the dependent variable is current period unexpected earnings and one 
period lagged unexpected earnings, respectively. Unexpected earnings are estimated using the 2-digit SIC industry-based 
model discussed in Section 2 (Approach 2). The explanatory variable ܴ݁ݐ௧௔ is size and book-to-market adjusted return. Control 
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Figure 5C: Slope coefficients from a regression of current and lagged earnings on signed returns, estimated 
across 50 portfolios based on leverage. 
 
The figure presents estimated coefficients for each of 50 portfolios formed by sorting on beginning of the period long-term debt-
to-assets ratio. Regressions are estimated from pooled time series and cross-sectional data for each portfolio. ‘Stars’ and ‘dots’ 
represent estimates of β1+ β2 from Equation (10) where the dependent variable is current period unexpected earnings and one 
period lagged unexpected earnings, respectively. Unexpected earnings are estimated using the 2-digit SIC industry-based model 
discussed in Section 2 (Approach 2). The explanatory variable ܴ݁ݐ௧௔ is size and book-to-market adjusted return. Control variables 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for variables used in subsequent analysis. The data are based on the intersection 
of the Compustat and CRSP databases. We limit the sample to the period 1964-2010 and exclude observations that 
have beginning-of-period price under $1. We require non-missing observations for (i) earnings before extraordinary 
items in years ݐ to ݐ-2; (ii) common shares outstanding and beginning-of-period price for periods ݐ-1 and ݐ-2; (iii) 
market adjusted stock return in the current period ݐ. Stock returns are compounded over the 12 months ending 3 
months after the fiscal year end and are subsequently adjusted by subtracting the 12 month return on a value-
weighted market index compounded over the same period. ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ is market capitalization as of the beginning of 
the fiscal year; ܾ/݉ is the ratio of book value of equity to its market value as of the beginning of the fiscal year, 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ is the ratio of long term debt to total market value of assets as of the beginning of the fiscal year; 
ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns; ܴ݁ݐ is market adjusted stock return; ܴ݁ݐ௔ is size and 
book-to-market adjusted stock return; ܺ is earnings per share (earnings before extraordinary items divided by the 
number of shares outstanding); P is stock price per share. ܦሺ. ሻ is an indicator function and ܧሾ. ሿ is the expectation 
operator. The expectation model is estimated based on 2-digit SIC industry groups and is described in Section 2. 
Subscripts denote time at (over) which variables are measured. To remove outliers and data errors, variables are 
truncated at both tails using 1% a cutoff value.    
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics. 
 
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
ܴ݁ݐ௧  162119 0.005 0.451 -0.277 -0.047 0.206 
ܴ݁ݐ௧௔ 159137 -0.021 0.420 -0.280 -0.059 0.174 
ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ 162119 0.040 0.144 0.013 0.062 0.106 
ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ 162119 0.036 0.132 0.019 0.058 0.094 
ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ 162119 0.042 0.121 0.021 0.058 0.095 
ܺ௧ െ Eሾܺ௧ሿ/ ௧ܲିଵ 162119 0.000 0.105 -0.019 0.008 0.039 
ܺ௧ିଵ െ Eሾܺ௧ିଵሿ/ ௧ܲିଶ 162119 0.000 0.087 -0.020 0.005 0.033 
ܺ௧ െ ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ 162119 0.004 0.133 -0.021 0.007 0.032 
ܺ௧ିଵ െ ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ 162119 0.010 0.117 -0.017 0.008 0.033 
݈݋݃ሺ ௧ܲିଵሻ 162119 2.615 0.996 1.964 2.741 3.331 
݈݋݃ሺܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌௧ିଵሻ 162119 5.081 2.121 3.517 4.923 6.492 
ܾ/݉௧ିଵ 158419 0.760 0.558 0.365 0.624 1.001 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௧ିଵ 158523 0.144 0.149 0.013 0.098 0.234 





Panel B: Pearson correlations. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 ܴ݁ݐ௧  1.00              
2 ܴ݁ݐ௧௔ 0.91 1.00             
3 ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ 0.28 0.27 1.00            
4 ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ 0.05 0.04 0.54 1.00           
5 ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ 0.06 0.04 0.35 0.45 1.00          
6 ܺ௧ െ Eሾܺ௧ሿ/ ௧ܲିଵ 0.27 0.28 0.73 0.00 0.05 1.00         
7 ܺ௧ିଵ െ Eሾܺ௧ିଵሿ/ ௧ܲିଶ 0.02 0.03 0.29 0.62 0.00 -0.01 1.00        
8 ܺ௧ െ ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ 0.26 0.25 0.55 -0.41 -0.06 0.79 -0.30 1.00       
9 ܺ௧ିଵ െ ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.41 -0.48 -0.03 0.75 -0.22 1.00      
10 ݈݋݃ሺ ௧ܲିଵሻ -0.01 0.05 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.10 0.18 -0.03 0.03 1.00     
11 ݈݋݃ሺܯ݇ݐ. ܥܽ݌௧ିଵሻ -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.71 1.00    
12 ܾ/݉௧ିଵ 0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.11 0.18 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.29 -0.37 1.00   
13 ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௧ିଵ 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 0.33 1.00  




Table 2: Replication of the main findings in Patatoukas and Thomas (2010). 
 
 
The data are based on the intersection of the Compustat and CRSP databases. We limit the sample to the period 1963-2010 and exclude observations that have 
beginning-of-period price under $1. We require non-missing observations for (i) earnings before extraordinary items in years ݐ to ݐ-2; (ii) common shares 
outstanding and beginning-of-period price for periods ݐ-1 and ݐ-2; (iii) market adjusted stock return in the current period ݐ. For comparability, we also require an 
equal number of observations for each model in a given table. Ret is market adjusted stock return compounded over the 12 months ending 3 months after the 
fiscal year end; X is earnings per share (earnings before extraordinary items divided by the number of shares outstanding); P is stock price per share. D(.) is an 
indicator function. Subscripts denote time at (over) which variables are measured. To remove outliers and data errors, variables are truncated at both tails using a 
1% cutoff value.  The table reports average annual cross-sectionally estimated coefficients and their standard errors based on the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
procedure. The model specification is as follows (Dependent variable is stated in the second column):  
0 1 0 1( 0) ( 0)t t t t tDependent variable D Ret Ret D Ret Ret            
Row Dependent 
Variable 
Statistic ࢻ૙ ࢻ૚ ࢼ૙ ࢼ૚ ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ R-squared Number 
Obs. 
(1) ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.081 0.011 0.017 0.249 0.265 0.170 162119 
  t Value 13.468 4.581 3.853 17.805 18.074   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(2) ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.065 0.003 -0.036 0.148 0.112 0.041 162119 
  t Value 11.626 1.507 -10.732 14.534 13.518   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(3) ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ Estimate 0.070 0.001 -0.035 0.135 0.100 0.038 162119 
  t Value 13.135 0.458 -12.057 12.649 11.006   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.649 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(4) 1/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.081 -0.001 0.078 -0.218 -0.141 0.064 162119 
  t Value 20.248 -0.604 13.235 -13.036 -11.523   





Table 3: The effect of controlling for ex ante determinants of expected earnings on bias in asymmetric timeliness. 
 
Table 3 replicates the main results in PT (2010) using unadjusted (raw) returns. The data are based on the intersection of the Compustat and CRSP databases. We 
limit the sample to the period 1964-2010 and exclude observations that have beginning-of-period price under $1. We require non-missing observations for (i) 
earnings before extraordinary items in years ݐ to ݐ-2; (ii) common shares outstanding and beginning-of-period price for periods ݐ-1 and ݐ-2; (iii) market adjusted 
stock return in the current period. The use of control variables further restricts the sample to non-missing book-value of equity, total liabilities, and standard 
deviation of 12 monthly returns during the annual period ݐ-1. For comparability, we also require an equal number of observations for each model in a given table. 
Ret is market adjusted stock return compounded over the 12 months ending 3 months after the fiscal year end; X is earnings per share (earnings before 
extraordinary items divided by the number of shares outstanding); P is stock price per share. D(.) is an indicator function. Control variables are measured as of 
beginning of the year t and include natural logarithm of beginning of period stock price and market capitalization (scale proxies), book-to-market ratio, leverage 
(total liabilities divided by market value of equity plus total liabilities), volatility (standard deviation of returns over prior year). Subscripts denote time at (over) 
which variables are measured. To remove outliers and data errors, variables are truncated at both tails using a 1% cutoff value.  The table reports average annual 
cross-sectionally estimated coefficients and their standard errors based on the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure. The model specification is as follows 
(Dependent variable is stated in the second column):  
0 1 0 1 1( 0) ( 0)t t t t k kt tDependent variable D Ret Ret D Ret Ret Controls              
Row Dependent 
Variable 
Statistic ࢻ૙ ࢻ૚ ࢼ૙ ࢼ૚ ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ R-squared Number 
Obs. 
(1) ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.046 0.012 0.041 0.183 0.224 0.266 136894 
  t Value 8.292 6.412 9.572 15.694 16.420   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(2) ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.018 0.002 -0.006 0.049 0.043 0.188 136894 
  t Value 2.990 1.905 -3.298 8.457 7.523   
  Pr > |t| 0.004 0.063 0.002 0.000 0.000   
(3) ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ Estimate 0.023 0.000 -0.009 0.042 0.033 0.177 136894 
  t Value 3.692 0.334 -4.885 7.375 6.277   
  Pr > |t| 0.001 0.740 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(4) 1/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.388 -0.001 0.003 -0.006 -0.004 0.752 136894 
  t Value 25.915 -1.287 2.200 -2.028 -1.401   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.204 0.033 0.048 0.168   
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Table 4: Unexpected earnings, unexpected returns, and the magnitude of bias in asymmetric timeliness. 
 
Model specifications in PT (2010) are contrasted to specifications isolating the expected components of returns and earnings. Panels A and B present estimates 
with and without controls for firm level determinants of expected earnings.  Expected earnings are estimated from the 2-digit SIC industry-based model described 
in Section 2 (Approach 2). Expected returns are estimated as the value weighted returns on 5×5 portfolios constructed by sorting annually on beginning of period 
market capitalization and then market-to-book ratio.  The data are based on the intersection of the Compustat and CRSP databases. We limit the sample to 1964-
2010 and exclude observations that have beginning-of-period price under $1. We require non-missing observations for (i) earnings before extraordinary items in 
years ݐ to ݐ-2; (ii) common shares outstanding and beginning-of-period price for periods ݐ-1 and ݐ-2; (iii) size and book-to-market adjusted stock return in period 
t; and (iv) a minimum of 10 observations per industry in a given year, to estimate expected earnings. The use of control variables further restricts the sample to 
non-missing book-value of equity, total liabilities, and standard deviation of 12 monthly returns during the annual period ݐ-1. For comparability, we also require 
an equal number of observations for each model reported in the table. Reta is size and book-to-market adjusted (unexpected) return, adjusted by subtracting from 
return compounded over the 12 months (ending 3 months after the fiscal year end) the 12 month return on a value-weighted portfolio compounded over the same 
period; we require 12 non-missing monthly returns for each firm and further require a minimum of 10 non-missing return observations for each portfolio in a 
given year. X is earnings per share (earnings before extraordinary items divided by the number of shares outstanding); P is stock price per share. D(.) is an 
indicator function and E[.] is the expectation operator.  Control variables are measured as of beginning of the year t and include natural logarithm of beginning of 
period stock price and market capitalization (scale proxies), book-to-market ratio, leverage (total liabilities divided by market value of equity plus total 
liabilities), volatility (standard deviation of returns over prior year). Subscripts denote time at (over) which variables are measured. To remove outliers and data 
errors, variables are truncated at both tails using a 1% cutoff value. The table reports average annual cross-sectionally estimated coefficients and their standard 
errors based on the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure. The model specification is as follows (Dependent variable is stated in the second column): 
 
Panel A: Without control variables 
0 1 0 1( 0) ( 0)
a a a a
t t t t tDependent variable D Ret Ret D Ret Ret            
Row Dependent Variable Statistic ࢻ૙ ࢻ૚ ࢼ૙ ࢼ૚ ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ R-squared Number Obs. 
(1) ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.082 0.015 0.022 0.229 0.251 0.165 133237 
  t Value 13.335 7.248 5.949 14.728 15.742   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(2) ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.066 0.004 -0.035 0.132 0.097 0.033 133237 
  t Value 12.147 2.384 -11.068 11.855 10.736   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(3) ܺ௧ െ Eሾܺ௧ሿ/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.013 0.011 0.040 0.117 0.157 0.136 133237 
  t Value 11.239 7.686 15.144 12.698 14.645   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(4) ܺ௧ିଵ െ Eሾܺ௧ିଵሿ/ ௧ܲିଶ Estimate 0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.031 0.028 0.011 133237 
  t Value 7.775 1.988 -1.988 6.643 7.049   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.053 0.053 0.000 0.000   
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Panel B: Controlling for common determinants of expected earnings and returns 
0 1 0 1 1( 0) ( 0)
a a a a
t t t t k kt tDependent variable D Ret Ret D Ret Ret Controls              
Row Dependent Variable Statistic ࢻ૙ ࢻ૚ ࢼ૙ ࢼ૚ ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ R-squared Number 
Obs. 
(5) ܺ௧ െ Eሾܺ௧ሿ/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.019 0.011 0.038 0.124 0.162 0.161 133237 
  t Value 4.081 7.518 14.217 13.787 15.254   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(6) ܺ௧ିଵ െ Eሾܺ௧ିଵሿ/ ௧ܲିଶ Estimate -0.020 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.014 0.071 133237 
  t Value -4.688 1.073 0.954 2.626 3.459   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.289 0.345 0.012 0.001   
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Table 5: Earnings changes, fixed effects, and bias in asymmetric timeliness. 
Table 5 provides model specifications which isolate the expected component of earnings and returns. This analysis follows Approach 3 in Section 2, which 
assumes that expected earnings can be approximated by the fixed-effects. Expected returns are assumed to be equal to average value weighted portfolio return in 
a particular year. We use 5×5 portfolios are constructed annually by sorting observations on beginning of period market capitalization and, subsequently, market-
to-book ratios.  The data are based on the intersection of the Compustat and CRSP databases. We limit the sample to 1963-2010 and exclude observations that 
have beginning-of-period price under $1. We require non-missing observations for (i) earnings before extraordinary items in years ݐ to ݐ-3; (ii) common shares 
outstanding and beginning-of-period price for periods ݐ-1 to ݐ-3; (iii) size and book-to-market adjusted stock return in the current period. The last requirement 
imposes non-missing book-value of equity as of the end of ݐ-1 (we already require market capitalization to be available). For comparability, we also require an 
equal number of observations for each model reported in the table. ܴ݁ݐ௔ is size and book-to-market adjusted return computed by taking stock return compounded 
over the 12 months (ending 3 months after the fiscal year end) and adjusting it by subtracting the 12 month return on a value-weighted portfolio return 
compounded over the same period; we require 12 non-missing monthly returns for each firm and further require a minimum of 10 non-missing observations for 
each portfolio in a given year. X is earnings per share (earnings before extraordinary items divided by the number of shares outstanding); P is stock price per 
share. D(.) is an indicator function and E[.] is the expectation operator.  Subscripts denote time at (over) which variables are measured. To remove outliers and 
data errors, variables are truncated at both tails using 1% cutoff value. The table reports average annual cross-sectionally estimated coefficients and their standard 
errors based on the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure. The model specification is as follows (Dependent variable is stated in the second column): 
0 1 0 1( 0) ( 0)
a a a a
t t t t tDependent variable D Ret Ret D Ret Ret            
Row Dependent Variable Statistic ࢻ૙ ࢻ૚ ࢼ૙ ࢼ૚ ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢼ૚ R-squared Number Obs. 
(1) ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.081 0.015 0.020 0.234 0.254 0.160 142255 
  t Value 13.073 7.119 5.378 15.204 16.026   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(2) ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.078 0.002 -0.029 0.120 0.091 0.031 142255 
  t Value 13.194 1.260 -9.576 10.924 10.348   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(3) ܺ௧ െ ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ Estimate 0.016 0.011 0.059 0.093 0.152 0.103 142255 
  t Value 7.215 7.523 16.753 8.479 13.184   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(4) ܺ௧ିଵ െ ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ Estimate 0.010 0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.006 0.007 142255 
  t Value 4.700 0.763 3.337 -0.251 1.596   
  Pr > |t| 0.000 0.449 0.002 0.803 0.117   
(5) ܺ௧/ ௧ܲିଵ െf.e.(i) Estimate 0.010 0.008 0.044 0.093 0.137 0.097 142255 
  t Value 2.234 4.471 12.225 8.728 12.298   
  Pr > |t| 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
(6) ܺ௧ିଵ/ ௧ܲିଵ െf.e.(i) Estimate 0.002 -0.001 -0.012 0.020 0.009 0.009 142255 
  t Value 0.515 -0.628 -4.542 2.750 1.427   
  Pr > |t| 0.609 0.533 0.000 0.008 0.160   
(7) ܺ௧ିଶ/ ௧ܲିଶ െf.e.(i) Estimate 0.003 -0.003 -0.010 0.014 0.004 0.009 142255 
  t Value 0.843 -2.966 -4.061 2.139 0.845   
  Pr > |t| 0.404 0.005 0.000 0.038 0.402   
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